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Single-nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)The protection of privacy of individual-level information in genome-wide association study (GWAS) dat-
abases has been a major concern of researchers following the publication of ‘‘an attack’’ on GWAS data by
Homer et al. (2008). Traditional statistical methods for conﬁdentiality and privacy protection of statistical
databases do not scale well to deal with GWAS data, especially in terms of guarantees regarding protec-
tion from linkage to external information. The more recent concept of differential privacy, introduced by
the cryptographic community, is an approach that provides a rigorous deﬁnition of privacy with mean-
ingful privacy guarantees in the presence of arbitrary external information, although the guarantees may
come at a serious price in terms of data utility. Building on such notions, Uhler et al. (2013) proposed new
methods to release aggregate GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy. We extend the
methods developed in Uhler et al. (2013) for releasing differentially-private v2-statistics by allowing for
arbitrary number of cases and controls, and for releasing differentially-private allelic test statistics. We
also provide a new interpretation by assuming the controls’ data are known, which is a realistic assump-
tion because some GWAS use publicly available data as controls. We assess the performance of the pro-
posed methods through a risk-utility analysis on a real data set consisting of DNA samples collected by
the Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium and compare the methods with the differentially-private
release mechanism proposed by Johnson and Shmatikov (2013).
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.11. Introduction
A genome-wide association study (GWAS) tries to identify ge-
netic variations that are associated with a disease. A typical GWAS
examines single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from thou-
sands of individuals and produces aggregate statistics, such as
the v2-statistic and the corresponding p-value, to evaluate the
association of a SNP with a disease.
For many years researchers have assumed that it is safe to pub-
lish aggregate statistics of SNPs that they found most relevant to
the disease. Because these aggregate statistics were pooled from
thousands of individuals, they believed that their release would
not compromise the participants’ privacy. However, such belief
was challenged when Homer et al. [1] demonstrated that, under
certain conditions, given an individual’s genotype, one only needs
the minor allele frequencies (MAFs) in a study and other publiclyavailable MAF information, such as SNP data from the HapMap
project, in order to ‘‘accurately and robustly’’ determine whether
the individual is in the test population or the reference population.
Here, the test population can be the cases in a study, and the refer-
ence population can be the data from the HapMap project. Homer
et al. [1] deﬁned a distance metric that contrasts the similarity be-
tween an individual and the test population and that between the
individual and the reference population, and constructed a t-test
based on this distance metric. They then showed that their method
of identifying an individual’s membership status has almost zero
false positive rate and zero false negative rate.
However, Braun et al. [4] argued that the key assumptions of
the Homer et al. [1] attack are too stringent to be applicable in real-
istic settings. Most problematic are the assumptions that (i) the
SNPs are in linkage equilibrium and (ii) that the individual, the ref-
erence population, and the test population are samples from the
same underlying population. They presented a sensitivity analysis
Table 1
Genotype distribution.
# Of minor alleles Total
0 1 2
Case r0 r1 r2 R
Control s0 s1 s2 S
Total n0 n1 n2 N
Table 2
Allelic distribution.
Allele type Total
Minor Major
Case r1 þ 2r2 2r0 þ r1 2R
Control s1 þ 2s2 2s0 þ s1 2S
Total n1 þ 2n2 2n0 þ n1 2N
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assumption results in a substantial increase in variance and viola-
tion of the second condition, together with the condition that the
reference population and the test population have different sizes,
results in the test statistic deviating considerably from the stan-
dard normal distribution.
Notwithstanding the apparent limitation of the Homer et al. [1]
attack, the National Institute of Health (NIH) was cautious about
the potential breach of privacy in genetic studies (see Couzin [5]
and Zerhouni and Nabel [6]), and swiftly instituted an elaborate
approval process that every researcher has to go through in order
to gain access to aggregate genetic data.2,3 This NIH policy remains
in effect today.
The paper by Homer et al. [1] attracted considerable attention
within the genetics community and spurred interest in investigat-
ing the vulnerability of conﬁdentiality protection of GWAS dat-
abases. The research efforts include modiﬁcations and extensions
of the Homer et al. attack, alternative formulations of the identiﬁ-
cation problem, and different aspects of attacking and protecting
the GWAS databases; e.g., see [7–17]. In partial response to this lit-
erature, Uhler et al. [2] proposed new methods for releasing aggre-
gate GWAS data without compromising an individual’s privacy by
focusing on the release of differentially-private minor allele fre-
quencies, v2-statistics and p-values.
In this paper, we develop a differentially-private allelic test sta-
tistic and extend the results on differentially-private v2-statistics
in [2] to allow for an arbitrary number of cases and controls. We
start with some main deﬁnitions and notation in Section 2. The
new sensitivity results are presented in Section 3. Uhler et al. [2]
proposed an algorithm based on the Laplace mechanism for releas-
ing theM most relevant SNPs in a differentially-private way. In the
same paper they also developed an alternative approach to differ-
ential privacy in the GWAS setting using what is known as the
exponential mechanism linked to an objective function perturbation
method by Chaudhuri et al. [18]. This was proposed as a way to
achieve a differentially-private algorithm for detecting epistasis.
But the exponential mechanism could in principle have also been
used as a direct alternative to the Laplace mechanism of Uhler
et al. [2]. This is in fact what Johnson and Shmatikov [3] proposed.
Their method selects the top-rankedM SNPs using the exponential
mechanism. In Section 4 we review the algorithm based on the La-
place mechanism from [2] and propose a new algorithm based on
the exponential mechanism by adapting the method by Johnson
and Shmatikov [3]. Finally, in Section 5 we compare our two algo-
rithms to the algorithm proposed in [3] by analyzing a data set
consisting of DNA samples collected by the Wellcome Trust Con-
sortium (WTCCC)4 and made available to us for reanalysis.
2. Main deﬁnitions and notation
The concept of differential privacy, recently introduced by the
cryptographic community (e.g., Dwork et al. [19]), provides a no-
tion of privacy guarantees that protect GWAS databases against
arbitrary external information.
Deﬁnition 1. Let D denote the set of all data sets. Write D  D0 if D
and D0 differ in one individual. A randomized mechanism K is
-differentially private if, for all D  D0 and for any measurable set
S  R,
PrðKðDÞ 2 SÞ
PrðKðD0Þ 2 SÞ 6 e
:2 http://gwas.nih.gov/pdf/Data%20Sharing%20Policy%20Modiﬁcations.pdf.
3 http://epi.grants.cancer.gov/dac/da_request.html.
4 http://www.wtccc.org.uk/.Deﬁnition 2. The sensitivity of a function f : DN ! Rd, where DN
denotes the set of all databases with N individuals, is the smallest
number Sðf Þ such that
kf ðDÞ  f ðD0Þk1 6 Sðf Þ;
for all data sets D;D0 2 DN such that D  D0.
Releasing f ðDÞ þ b, where b  Laplace 0; Sðf Þ
 
, satisﬁes the deﬁ-
nition of -differential privacy (e.g., see [19]). This type of release
mechanism is often referred to as the Laplace mechanism. Here 
is the privacy budget; a smaller value of  implies stronger privacy
guarantees.
2.1. SNP summaries using contingency tables
Following the notation in [20], we can summarize the data for a
single SNP in a case-control study with R cases and S controls using
a 2 3 genotype contingency table shown in Table 1, or a 2 2
allelic contingency table shown in Table 2. We require that mar-
gins of the contingency table be positive.
Deﬁnition 3. The (Pearson) v2-statistic based on a genotype
contingency table (Table 1) is
Y ¼ ðr0N  n0RÞ
2
n0RS
þ ðr1N  n1RÞ
2
n1RS
þ ðr2N  n2RÞ
2
n2RS
:Deﬁnition 4. The allelic test is also known as the Cochran–Armit-
age trend test for the additive model. The allelic test statistic based
on a genotype contingency table (Table 1) is equivalent to the
v2-statistic based on the corresponding allelic contingency table
(Table 2). The allelic test statistic can be written as
YA ¼ 2N
3
RS
ðs1 þ 2s2Þ  SN ðn1 þ 2n2Þ
 2
2Nðn1 þ 2n2Þ  ðn1 þ 2n2Þ2
:
The Pearson v2-test for genotype data and the allelic test for al-
lele data are among the most commonly used statistical tests for
association in GWAS. Zheng et al. [21] suggest using the allelic test
when the genetic model of the phenotype is additive, and the
Pearson v2-test when the genetic model is unknown.3. Sensitivity results
Under the assumption that there are an equal number of
cases and controls, Uhler et al. [2] found the sensitivities of the
F. Yu et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 133–141 135v2-statistic, the corresponding p-value and the projected p-value.
For completeness, we brieﬂy review these results here.
Theorem 3.1 (Uhler et al. [2]). The sensitivity of the v2-statistic
based on a 3 2 contingency table with positive margins and N=2
cases and N=2 controls is 4NNþ2.Theorem 3.2 (Uhler et al. [2]). The sensitivity of the p-values of the
v2-statistic based on a 3 2 contingency table with positive margins
and N=2 cases and N=2 controls is expð2=3Þ, when the null distribu-
tion is a v2-distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.Corollary 3.3 (Uhler et al. [2]). Projecting all p-values larger than
p ¼ expðN=cÞ onto p results in a sensitivity of
expðN=cÞ  exp  Nð2Nc4N4cþc2Þ2cðNc2NcÞ
 
for any ﬁxed constant c P 3,
which is a factor of N=2.
In the remainder of this section, we generalize these results to
allow for an arbitrary number of cases and controls. This makes
the proposed methods applicable in a typical GWAS setting, in
which there are more controls than cases, as researchers often
use data pertaining to other diseases as controls to increase the
statistical power.
3.1. Sensitivity results for the Pearson v2-statistic
We ﬁrst consider the situation in which the adversary has com-
plete information about the controls. This situation arises when a
GWAS uses publicly available data for the controls, such as those
from the HapMap project. In this scenario, it is only necessary to
protect information about the cases.
Theorem 3.4. Let D denote the set of all 2 3 contingency tables
with positive margins, R cases and S controls. Suppose the numbers of
controls of all three genotypes are known. Let N ¼ Rþ S, and
smax ¼maxfs0; s1; s2g. The sensitivity of the v2-statistic based on
tables in D is bounded above by N2RS smax1þsmax.Proof. See A. h
Theorem 3.4 gives an upper bound for the sensitivity of the
v2-statistic based on 2 3 contingency tables with positive
margins and known numbers of controls for all three genotypes.
In Corollary 3.5 we show that, assuming r0 P r2 and s0 P s2, which
reﬂects the deﬁnition of a major and minor allele, the upper bound
for the sensitivity is attained.
Corollary 3.5. Let D denote the set of all 2 3 contingency tables
with positive margins, R cases and S controls. We further assume that
for tables in D; r0 P r2 and s0 P s2; i.e., in the case and control
populations the number of individuals having two minor alleles is no
greater than the number of individuals having two major alleles. The
sensitivity of the v2-statistic based on tables in D is N2RS 1 1maxfS;Rgþ1
 
,
where N ¼ Rþ S.Proof. For a change that occurs in the cases, we ﬁrst treat s0; s1,
and s2 as ﬁxed, and get the result in Theorem 3.4. By taking
ðr0; r1; r2; s0; s1; s2Þ ¼ ðr0;1; r2;0; S;0Þ; r0 P r2 > 0, and changing the
table in the direction of u ¼ ð1;1;0;0;0;0Þ, we attain the upper
bound N
2
RS ð1 1Sþ1Þ. The same analysis for a change that occurs in
the controls shows that the maximum change of the Pearson
v2-statistic (i.e., Y in A) is N2RS ð1 1Rþ1Þ. h
If we have no knowledge of either the cases or the controls, we
get the sensitivity result presented in Corollary 3.5. On the other
hand, when the controls are known, we can use Theorem 3.4 toreduce the sensitivity assigned to each set of SNPs grouped by
the maximum number of controls among the three genotypes.
However, in most GWAS the number of controls, S, is large and
smax ¼ maxfs0; s1; s2gP S=3. In this case, the following computa-
tion shows that the reduction in sensitivity obtained by Theo-
rem 3.4 is insigniﬁcant:
N2
RS
S
1þ S
( )
N2
RS
smax
1þ smax
( ),
6 N
2
RS
S
1þ S
( )
N2
RS
S=3
1þ S=3
( ),
¼ Sþ 3
Sþ 1  1:
In order to improve on statistical utility, Uhler et al. [2] proposed
projecting the p-values that are larger than a threshold value onto
the threshold value itself to reduce the sensitivity. In Theorem 3.6
we generalize this result to nonnegative score functions, showing
how to incorporate projections into the Laplace mechanism.
Theorem 3.6. Given a nonnegative function f ðdÞ, deﬁne
hCðdÞ ¼maxfC; f ðdÞg, with C > 0; i.e., we project values of f ðdÞ that
are smaller than C onto C. Let s denote the sensitivity of hCðdÞ, and
suppose Y  Laplace 0; s
 
, then WðdÞ ¼maxfC; ZðdÞg, with
ZðdÞ ¼ hCðdÞ þ Y, is -differentially private.Proof. From the deﬁnition ofWðdÞ, we know thatWðdÞP C for all
d. For t > C,
PðWðdÞ ¼ tÞ
PðWðd0Þ ¼ tÞ ¼
PðZðdÞ ¼ tÞ
PðZðd0Þ ¼ tÞ 6 expð jt  hCðd
0Þj  jt  hCðdÞ
 j=sÞ
6 expðjhCðdÞ  hCðd0Þj=sÞ 6 expðÞ:
For t ¼ C,
PðWðdÞ ¼ CÞ
PðWðd0Þ ¼ CÞ ¼
PðZðdÞ 6 CÞ
PðZðd0Þ 6 CÞ ¼
1
2 exp
ChC ðdÞ
s=
 
1
2 exp
ChC ðd0 Þ
s=
 
6 expðjhCðd0Þ  hCðdÞj=sÞ 6 expðÞ: 
For example, when we apply this result to v2-statistics in a dif-
ferentially-private mechanism, we set C to be the v2-statistic that
corresponds to a small p-value and use an upper bound for the sen-
sitivity of the projection function as sC , namely
sC ¼min Ymax  C;N
2
RS
1 1
maxfS;Rg þ 1
	 
( )
:3.2. Sensitivity results for the allelic test statistic
Theorem 3.7. The sensitivity of the allelic test statistic based on a
2 3 contingency table with positive margins, R cases and S controls
is given by the maximum of
8N2S
Rð2Sþ3Þð2Sþ1Þ ;
4N2 ½ð2R21Þð2S1Þ1
RSð2Rþ1Þð2R1Þð2Sþ1Þ ;
8N2R
Sð2Rþ3Þð2Rþ1Þ ;
4N2 ½ð2S21Þð2R1Þ1
RSð2Sþ1Þð2S1Þð2Rþ1Þ
8>>>><
>>>>:
9>>>>=
>>>>;
:Proof. See B. h4. Privacy-preserving release of the top M statistics
In a GWAS setting, researchers usually assign to every SNP a
score that reﬂects its association with a disease, but only release
136 F. Yu et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 133–141scores for theMmost signiﬁcant SNPs. Most commonly used scores
are the Pearson v2-statistic, the allelic test statistic, and the corre-
sponding p-values. If thoseM SNPs were chosen according to a uni-
form distribution, -differential privacy can be achieved by the
Laplace mechanism with noise Ms , where s denotes the sensitivity
of the scoring statistic. Recall that  is the privacy budget, so a
smaller value of  implies stronger privacy guarantees.
However, by releasing M SNPs according to their rankings, an
attacker knows that the released SNPs have higher scores than
all other SNPs regardless of the face value of the released scores.
Therefore, we need a more sophisticated algorithm for releasing
the M most signiﬁcant SNPs.
Algorithm 1. The -differentially private algorithm for releasing
the M most relevant SNPs using the Laplace mechanism.Input: The score (e.g., v2-statistic or allelic test statistic) used
to rank allM0 SNPs, the number of SNPs,M, that we want to
release, the sensitivity, s, of the statistic, and , the privacy
budget.
Output: M noisy statistics.
1. Add Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 4Ms to the true
statistics.
2. Pick the topM SNPs with respect to the perturbed statistics.
Denote the corresponding set of SNPs by S.
3. Add new Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2Ms to the
true statistics in S.
Adapting from the differentially-private algorithm for releasing
the most frequent patterns in Bhaskar et al. [22] and Uhler et al. [2]
suggested an algorithm (see Algorithm 1) for releasing the M most
relevant SNPs ranked by their v2-statistics or the corresponding p-
values while satisfying differential privacy. They also showed that
adding noise directly to the v2-statistic achieves a better trade-off
between privacy and utility than by adding noise to the p-values or
cell entries themselves. Using the results from Section 3, we can
now also apply this algorithm when the number of cases and con-
trols differ.
While Algorithm 1 is based on the Laplace mechanism, in Algo-
rithm 2 we propose a new algorithm based on the exponential
mechanism by adopting and simplifying the ideas proposed by
Johnson and Shmatikov [3]. The ﬁrst application of the exponential
mechanism in the GWAS setting was given in [2], which resulted in
a differentially private algorithm for detecting epistasis.
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm 2 is -differentially private.Proof. See C. h5. Application of differentially private release mechanisms to
human GWAS data
In this section we evaluate the trade-off between data utility
and privacy risk by applying Algorithms 1 and 2 with the new sen-
sitivity results developed in Section 3 to a GWAS data set contain-
ing human DNA samples from WTCCC. We also compare the
performance of Algorithms 1 and 2 to that of the LocSig method
developed by Johnson and Shmatikov [3]. Essential to the LocSig
method is a scoring function based on the p-value of a statistical
test. In this paper, we call the resulting scores the JS scores. In con-
trast to [3], which used the p-value of the G-test to construct the JS
scores, we use the p-value of the Pearson v2-test instead.Algorithm 2. The -differentially private algorithm for releasing the
M most relevant SNPs using the exponential mechanism.Input: The score (e.g., v2-statistic or allelic test statistic) used
to rank allM0 SNPs, the number of SNPs,M, that we want to
release, the sensitivity, s, of the statistic, and , the privacy
budget.
Output: M noisy statistics.
1. Let S ¼ ; and qi ¼ score of SNPi.
2. For i 2 f1; . . . ;M0g, set wi ¼ exp qi4Ms
 
.
3. Set pi ¼ wi
PM0
j¼1wj
.
; i 2 f1; . . . ;M0g, the probability of
sampling the ith SNP.
4. Sample k 2 f1; . . . ;M0g with probability fp1; . . . ; pM0 g. Add
SNPk to S. Set qk ¼ 1.
5. If the size of S is less than M, return to Step 2.
6. Add new Laplace noise with mean zero and scale 2Ms to the
true statistics in S.5.1. Data set from WTCCC: Crohn’s disease
We use a real data set that was collected by the WTCCC and in-
tended for genome-wide association studies of Crohn’s disease. The
data set consists of DNA samples from 3 cohorts, the subjects of
which all lived within Great Britain and identiﬁed themselves as
white Europeans: 1958 British Birth Cohort (58C), UK Blood Services
(NBS), and Crohn’s disease (CD). In the original study [23] the DNA
samples from the 58C and NBS cohorts are treated as controls and
those from the CD cohort as cases.
The data were sampled using the Affymetrix GeneChip 500 K
Mapping Array Set. The genotype data were called by an algorithm
named CHIAMO (see [23]), which WTCCC developed and deemed
more powerful than Affymetrix’s BRLMM genotype calling algo-
rithm. According to the WTCCC analysis, some DNA samples were
contaminated or came from non-Caucasian ancestry. In addition,
they indicated that some SNPs did not pass quality control ﬁlters.
Finally, WTCCC [23] removed additional SNPs from their analysis
by visually inspecting cluster plots.
5.2. Our re-analysis of the WTCCC data
In [23], the authors mainly used the allelic test and the Pearson
v2-test to ﬁnd SNPs with a strong association with Crohn’s disease,
and reported the relevant statistics and their p-values for the most
signiﬁcant SNPs. In general, the Wellcome Trust Case Control Con-
sortium [23] considered a SNP signiﬁcant if its allelic test p-value
or v2-test p-value were smaller than 105. In the supplementary
material of [23] they reported 26 signiﬁcant SNPs, 6 of which were
imputed. Per [23], imputing SNPs that do not exist in the WTCCC
databases does not affect the calculation of the allelic test statistics
or the Pearson v2-statistics of SNPs already in the WTCCC dat-
abases; therefore, we disregard the imputed SNPs in our analysis
and retain 20 signiﬁcant SNPs.
We followed the ﬁltering process in [23] closely and removed
DNA samples and SNPs that [23] deemed contaminated. However,
we did not remove any further SNPs due to poor cluster plots. We
veriﬁed that our processing of the raw genotype data leads to the
same results as those published in the supplementary material of
[23]: our calculations for 16 of the 20 reported signiﬁcant SNPs
match those in [23], deviating no more than 2% in allelic test sta-
tistic and v2-statistic. However, we found that a number of signif-
icant SNPs were not reported by the WTCCC. We corresponded
with one of the principal authors of [23] and received conﬁrmation
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Fig. 1. Unperturbed top v-statistics in descending order.
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Wellcome Trust Case Control Consortium [23] did not report these
SNPs because they suffered from poor calling quality according to
visual inspection of the cluster plot, a procedure that we did not
implement. We excluded from our analysis these SNPs that have
signiﬁcant allelic test p-values or v2-test p-values, but are not re-
ported by the WTCCC.
In Fig. 1 we plot the v2-statistics resulting from our analysis in
descending order. Note that there is a large gap between the 5thFig. 2. Performance comparison of Algorithm 1 (‘‘Laplace’’), Algorithm 2 with v2-statisti
(‘‘JS’’) based on the p-value of the v2-statistic. Each row corresponds to a ﬁxed M, the nu
which is relevant to the LocSig method only; it is irrelevant to the other methods. Data
randomly chosen 1% sample of SNPs with p-values larger than 105; the total number oand the 6th largest v2-statistics. This is an important observation
for the risk-utility analysis of the perturbed statistics in Section 5.3.
Because of the nature of the distribution of the top v2-statistics in
this data set, it is easier to recover all top 5 SNPs as the top rated 5
SNPs in the perturbed data than it is to recover all top M SNPs for
M < 5 orM > 5, as is evident in Fig. 2, which we discuss in the next
section.
To summarize, we were able to reproduce a high percentage of
signiﬁcant SNPs from [23]. Therefore, we are conﬁdent that our
data processing procedure is sound and the v2-statistics and allelic
test statistics that we obtained from the data are comparable with
those produced in a high quality GWAS.
5.3. Risk-utility analysis of differentially private Pearson v2-statistics
In this section, we use the v2-statistics obtained from the
WTCCC dataset described in Section 5.1 and analyze the statistical
utility of releasing differentially private v2-statistics for various
privacy budgets, . With 1748 cases and 2938 controls in the
WTCCC dataset, we use Corollary 3.5 to obtain a sensitivity of
4.27 for the v2-statistic.
We deﬁne statistical utility as follows: let S0 be the set of top M
SNPs ordered according to their true v2-statistics and let S be the
set of top M SNPs chosen after perturbation (either by Algorithm
1 using the Laplace mechanism or by Algorithm 2 using the expo-
nential mechanism). Then the utility as a function of  is
uðÞ ¼ jS0 \ SjjS0j :cs as scores (‘‘Exponential’’), and the LocSig method in Johnson and Shmatikov [3]
mber of top SNPs to release. Each column corresponds to a ﬁxed threshold p-value,
used to generate this ﬁgure consist of SNPs with p-values smaller than 105 and a
f SNPs used for calculation is 3882.
Table 4
Ranking of the top 6 SNPs by v2-statistics and the corresponding JS scores. K denotes
the total number of SNPs.
Scoring scheme Threshold p-value Score (nearest integer)
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th
v2-Statistic – 61 54 54 52 48 34
JS score 0.001/K 51 31 37 33 25 6
JS score 0.01/K 61 38 47 41 33 13
JS score 0.05/K 69 43 55 48 38 18
138 F. Yu et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 133–141We perform the following procedure to approximate the expected
utility E½uðÞ for Algorithm 1: (i) add Laplace noise with mean zero
and scale 4Ms to the true v
2-statistics, where s is the sensitivity of the
v2-statistic; (ii) pick the top M SNPs with respect to the perturbed
v2-statistics; (iii) denote the set of SNPs chosen according to the
true and perturbed v2-statistics by S0 and S, respectively; (iv) cal-
culate uðÞ ¼ jS0\SjjS0 j . We repeat the aforementioned procedure 50
times for a ﬁxed  and report the average of the utility uðÞ. To
approximate E½uðÞ for Algorithm 2, we repeat 50 times the process
of generating S by performing steps 1–5 in Algorithm 2 and report
the average of the utility uðÞ. In order to approximate E½uðÞ for the
procedure LocSig from [3], we rank the SNPs by their v2-statistics
but replace the scores in Step 1 by the JS scores.
The runtimes of the different algorithms vary considerably (see
Table 3). The runtimes were obtained on a PC with an Intel i5-
3570K CPU, 32 GB of RAM and the Ubuntu 13.04 operating system.
Calculating the v2-statistics from genotype tables is a trivial task
and takes very little time. Calculating the JS scores can be a daunt-
ing task, however, if one cannot ﬁnd a clever simpliﬁcation. The JS
score is essentially the shortest Hamming distance between the
original database and the set of databases at which the signiﬁcance
of the p-value changes. Thus without any simpliﬁcations, one
would need to search the entire space of databases in order to ﬁnd
the table with the shortest Hamming distance. In our implementa-
tion for ﬁnding the JS score for a genotype table based on the p-va-
lue corresponding to the v2-statistic, we simplify the calculation by
greedily following the path of maximum change of the v2-statistic
until we ﬁnd a table with altered signiﬁcance.
In Fig. 2, we compare the performance of Algorithm 1 (based on
the Laplace mechanism) and Algorithm 2 (based on the exponen-
tial mechanism) to LocSig [3]. It is clear that when  ¼ 1, the Loc-
Sigmethod outperforms the other methods with respect to utility.
Nevertheless, we note a few features regarding the performance of
LocSig.
	 When M ¼ 3, the utility of the LocSig method cannot exceed
0.67 even as  continues to increase. This artifact is due to the
fact that the ranking of SNPs based on the JS scores is different
from the ranking based on the v2-statistics.
	 Table 4 gives the top 6 SNPs ranked by their v2-statistics and
the corresponding JS scores. For all threshold p-values, the JS
score of the 4th SNP is larger than that of the 2nd SNP and that
of the ith SNP for iP 5. Thus, when  is sufﬁciently large, the
LocSig method will almost always output the 1st, 3rd, and
4th SNPs. Consequently, the utility for the LocSig method will
not increase when  increases.
	 The LocSig method is sensitive to the choice of p-value. This
becomes apparent in the plots forM ¼ 15 in Fig. 2. The risk-util-
ity curves of the LocSig method tend to have lower utility for
the same  when the threshold p-value is smaller.
	 Even though Algorithm 1 and 2 do not perform as well as the
LocSig method for small values of , they do not suffer from
the aforementioned issues. Furthermore, we can see fromTable 3
Comparison of runtime for the simulations in Section 5.3 The number of repetitions is
50, the number of different values forM is 4, the number of different values for  is 15,
and the number of SNPs is around 4000. S is the set of SNPs to be released after the
perturbation.
Method Time spent on
generating S (in min)
Time spent on calculating the
scores (in min)
Algorithm 1
(Laplace)
0.04 0
Algorithm 2
(Exponential)
1.53 0
LocSig (JS) 2.00 3.50Fig. 2 that the exponential mechanism always outperforms
the Laplace mechanism, i.e., it achieves a higher utility for each
value of .
To summarize, in this application Algorithm 2 outperforms
Algorithm 1. The method based on LocSig improves on Algorithm
2 for small values of , but shows some problematic behavior when
 increases. Finally, the LocSig method comes at a much higher
computational cost than the other two algorithms and might not
be computationally feasible for some data sets.6. Conclusions
A number of authors have argued that it is possible to use
aggregate data to compromise the privacy of individual-level infor-
mation collected in GWAS databases. We have used the concept of
differential privacy and built on the approach in Uhler et al. [2] to
propose new methods to release aggregate GWAS data without
compromising an individual’s privacy. A key component of the dif-
ferential privacy approach involves the sensitivity of a released sta-
tistic when we remove an observation. In this paper, we have
obtained sensitivity results for the Pearson v2-statistic when there
are arbitrary number of cases and controls. Furthermore, we
showed that the sensitivity can be reduced in the situation where
data for the cases (or the controls) are known to the attacker. Nev-
ertheless, we also showed that the reduction in sensitivity is insig-
niﬁcant in typical GWAS, in which the number of cases is large.
By incorporating the two-step differentially-private mechanism
for releasing the top M SNPs (Algorithm 1) with the projected La-
place perturbation mechanism (Theorem 3.6), we have created
an algorithm that outputs signiﬁcant SNPs while preserving differ-
ential privacy. We demonstrated that the algorithm works effec-
tively in human GWAS datasets, and that it produces outputs
that resemble the outputs of regular GWAS. We also showed that
the performance of Algorithm 1, which is based on the Laplace
mechanism, can be improved by using Algorithm 2, which is based
on the exponential mechanism. Furthermore, Algorithm 2 is com-
putationally more efﬁcient than the LocSig method of Johnson
and Shmatikov [3], and it performs better for increasing values of .
Finally, we showed that a risk-utility analysis of the algorithm
allows us to understand the trade-off between privacy budget
and statistical utility, and therefore helps us decide on the appro-
priate level of privacy guarantee for the released data. We hope
that approaches such as those that we demonstrate in this paper
will allow the release of more information from GWAS going for-
ward and allay the privacy concerns that others have voiced over
the past decade.
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Appendix A. Proof of Theorem 3.4
Proof. The Pearson v2-statistic can be written as
Y ¼ r0 
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þ r1 
n1R
N
 2
n1R
N
þ r2 
n2R
N
 2
n2R
N
þ s0 
n0S
N
 2
n0S
N
þ s1 
n1S
N
 2
n1S
N
þ s2 
n2S
N
 2
n2S
N
¼ ðr0N  n0RÞ2 1n0RN þ
1
n0SN
	 

þ ðr1N  n1RÞ2 1n1RN þ
1
n1SN
	 

þ ðr2N  n2RÞ2 1n2RN þ
1
n2SN
	 

¼ ðr0N  n0RÞ
2
n0RS
þ ðr1N  n1RÞ
2
n1RS
þ ðr2N  n2RÞ
2
n2RS
¼ r
2
0N
2
n0RS
 2r0N
S
þ n0R
S
þ r
2
1N
2
n1RS
 2r1N
S
þ n1R
S
þ r
2
2N
2
n2RS
 2r2N
S
þ n2R
S
¼ N
2
RS
r20
n0
þ r
2
1
n1
þ r
2
2
n2
	 

 N R
S
ðA:1aÞ
¼ N
2
RS
s20
n0
þ s
2
1
n1
þ s
2
2
n2
	 

 N S
R
: ðA:1bÞ
We denote a contingency table and its column sums by
v ¼ ðr0; r1; r2; s0; s1; s2;n0;n1; n2Þ. Let v 0 ¼ v þ u, with v 0 and v differ-
ing by Hamming distance 1. Finding the sensitivity of Y boils down
to ﬁnding v and u that maximize jYðvÞ  Yðv þ uÞj.
Suppose r0 > 0 and consider u ¼ ð1;1;0; 0;0;0;1;1;0Þ. As a
consequence of (A.1b) we ﬁnd that
YðvÞ  Yðv þ uÞ ¼ N
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Because r0 > 0, we get that n0 ¼ r0 þ s0 P 1þ s0, and
0 6 s
2
0
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n0
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1þ smax :Therefore,
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A similar analysis for all possible directions u and scenarios in
which r1 > 0 or r2 > 0 reveals that the sensitivity of Y is bounded
above by N
2
RS
smax
1þsmax. hAppendix B. Proof of Theorem 3.7Proof. We denote a contingency table and its column sums by
v ¼ ðr0; r1; r2; s0; s1; s2;n0;n1;n2Þ. With the number of cases, R, and
the number of controls, S, ﬁxed, we can simply write
vs ¼ ðs1; s2;n1;n2Þ or v r ¼ ðr1; r2;n1;n2Þ. Then the allelic test
statistic can be written as
YAðvsÞ ¼ 2N
3
RS
fðs1 þ 2s2Þ  SN ðn1 þ 2n2Þg
2
2Nðn1 þ 2n2Þ  ðn1 þ 2n2Þ2
;
or YAðv rÞ ¼ 2N
3
RS
fðr1 þ 2r2Þ  RN ðn1 þ 2n2Þg
2
2Nðn1 þ 2n2Þ  ðn1 þ 2n2Þ2
:
Let v 0 ¼ v þ u, with v 0 and v differing by Hamming distance 1.
Finding the sensitivity of YA boils down to ﬁnding v and v 0 that
maximize jYAðvÞ  YAðv 0Þj. This is equivalent to maximizing
jYAðv sÞ  YAðv s þ usÞj and jYAðvrÞ  YAðv r þ urÞj, with us and ur
deﬁned as follows:
when r0 > 0,
us1 ¼ ð0;0;1;0Þ ðCase 0! Case 1Þ
us2 ¼ ð0;0;0;1Þ ðCase 0! Case 2Þ
when s0 > 0,
ur1 ¼ ð0;0;1;0Þ ðControl 0! Control 1Þ
ur2 ¼ ð0;0;0;1Þ ðControl 0! Control 2Þ:
In other words, when r0 > 0, we search for tables that maximize
jrYAðv sÞ 
 us1jr0>0 or jrYAðvsÞ 
 us2jr0>0; when s0 > 0, we search for ta-
bles that maximize jrYAðv rÞ 
 ur1js0>0 and jrYAðv rÞ 
 ur2js0>0.
Let us ﬁrst consider the case r0 > 0. We have
jrYAðvsÞ 
 us1j ¼ @@n1 YAðvsÞ
  and jrYAðvsÞ 
 us2j ¼ @@n2 YAðvsÞ
 . Denote
by
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140 F. Yu et al. / Journal of Biomedical Informatics 50 (2014) 133–141Therefore, tables that maximize jrYAðvsÞ 
 us1jr0>0 also maximize
jrYAðv sÞ 
 us2jr0>0. Furthermore, for the same table vs, the change
of YAðv sÞ in the direction of us2 is no less than that in the direction
of us1.
Fixing n1 and n2; @@n1 YAðvsÞ
  depends only on s1 and s2. So
maximizing @@n1 YAðvsÞ
  is equivalent to maximizing the absolute
value of
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where gðs1; s2Þ ¼ C þ SD2Nðn0n2Þ ¼ ðs1 þ 2s2Þ þ
Sðn1þ2n2Þ2
2Nðn0n2Þ . Note that the
term D does not depend on s1 or s2. There are three scenarios:
(i) when n0 ¼ n2; jf ðs1; s2Þj ¼ SN Djðs1 þ 2s2Þ  SN ðn1 þ 2n2Þj is
maximized when s1 þ 2s2 is minimized or maximized;
(ii) when n0 > n2; jf ðs1; s2Þj is maximized when jgðs1; s2Þj is max-
imized or minimized, which occurs when s1 þ 2s2 is mini-
mized or maximized;
(iii) when n0 < n2; jf ðs1; s2Þj is maximized when jgðs1; s2Þj is max-
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The preceding analysis shows that for any given n1 and n2,
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To summarize, when r0 > 0, for any table vs, the change of YAðv sÞ in
the direction of us2 is no less than that in the direction of u
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The same analysis for s0 > 0 reveals that
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 u4j ¼ 2jrYAðv rÞ 
 u3j ¼ 2 @@n1 YAðv rÞ
 , and the maximum
change of YA in the direction of u4 ¼ ð0;0;0;1;0;1;1; 0;1Þ  ur2
occurs
at v3¼ðR;0;0;1;1;S2;Rþ1;1;S2Þ;
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Proof. To show that Algorithm 2 is -differentially private, it
sufﬁces to show that choosing S is =2-differentially private. The
rest of the proof follows from the proof of Algorithm 1 in Uhler
et al. [2].
Following the notation in McSherry and Talwar [24], we deﬁne
the random variable of sampling a single SNP, eq, by
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where qðD; iÞ is the score for SNPi; s is the sensitivity for the scoring
function qðD; iÞ, and lðiÞ ¼ 1=M0 is constant. We also deﬁne
qBðD; iÞ ¼
score of the SNPi if i R B
1 if i 2 B :

where B is a set of SNPs and qB denotes the scoring function given
that the SNPs in B have been sampled and thus have 0 sampling
probability in subsequent sampling steps. Note that
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Let r denote a permutation of S.
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